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Understanding the Higher-Order Approach
to ConsciousnessRichard Brown,1 Hakwan Lau,2,3 and Joseph E. LeDoux4,5,6,*Highlights
Misunderstandings about HOT have
marginalized it relative to other
approaches.
We clarify some of the key misunder-
standings, including assumptions about
the equivalence between consciousness
and metacognition, and the role of intro-
spection and the self.
We reply to several objections, including
those concerning the nature of percep-
tion in the visual periphery and issues
raised about the value of so-called
‘no report’ paradigms.The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood
by critics. Here, we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from
other views, such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory
models (e.g., ﬁrst-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been
criticized for overintellectualizing consciousness. We show that, while higher-
order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are in fact considerably
less than often presumed. In this sense, HOT may be viewed as an intermediate
position between GWT and early sensory views. We also clarify that most propo-
nents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or
conﬁdence. Furthermore, compared with other existing theories, HOT can
arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as emotions
and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for
conceptualizing pathological mental states.We also address issues regarding the in-
volvement of prefrontal cortex, including
questions about whether it is necessary,
and whether its deactivation during
dreams andpsychedelic states is incom-
patible with it contributing to higher-order
awareness.
We propose a reconceptualization of
lower-order states that contribute to
higher-order awareness, including states
of prefrontal cortex and multimodal and
mnemonic states processed in posterior
cortical areas.
We provide arguments as to why the
HOT of consciousness may be superior
to both GWT and local recurrency the-
ory regarding its ability to account for
subjective experiences, especially of
complex states such as memories and
emotions that occur in everyday life
and that are hallmarks of psychopatho-
logical conditions.
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Consciousness (see Glossary), as used here, refers to subjective experience, or what is some-
times called phenomenal consciousness [1,2], as opposed to the condition of merely being
awake and alert and behaviorally responsive to external stimuli. To be phenomenally conscious
is for there to be something that it is like to be the entity in question, that is, something that it is
like for the entity itself [2].
Subjective experience is the stuff of novels, poems, and songs, of our emotions and memories,
the essence of being a human. It is hard to imagine what it would be like to not be sentient in
the way we are. Unsurprisingly, then, the science of consciousness is currently a vibrant and
thriving area of research. However, there is no generally accepted theory of the phenomena
being studied, and the phenomena themselves often do not includemany of the kinds of complex
experiences that we normally have in the course of day-to-day life, such as of our emotions
and memories.
Here, we argue that the foundation for a viable theory of such experiences exists but has not been
given the credit it deserves. We are referring to various ideas known collectively as HOT. HOT is
often overlooked, or lumped in with other cognitive theories of consciousness, such as GWT.
Even worse, it is sometimes dismissed out of hand as not empirically plausible compared with
other theories. Our main goal here is to identify and answer some of the most common questions
concerning the theory. First, however, we brieﬂy describe key features of HOT.
Theories of consciousness can be categorized as either ﬁrst-order theories or HOTs. In general,
there are two features that make a theory of consciousness a HOT rather than a ﬁrst-order theory.
The ﬁrst feature is a commitment to the claim that a mere first-order representation is not
sufﬁcient for conscious experiences to arise; some higher-order mechanism or mechanismsTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.009 1
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Trends in Cognitive Sciencesare also needed. For example, having a ﬁrst-order perceptual state about an external object is
often crucial for the organism to respond meaningfully to it. However, according to HOT, such
ﬁrst-order states can occur nonconsciously and are insufﬁcient for phenomenally conscious
experiences to occur [3]. This requirement of HOT distinguishes it from local versions of ﬁrst-
order theories, such as recurrent processing theories [4–7].
The second requirement of HOT comes from the common-sense claim that if an organism is in no
way aware of itself as being in a certain ﬁrst-order state, then it is not phenomenally conscious of
the content of that state. This is a logical consequence of what is called the Transitivity Principle
[3]. The basic idea, according to HOT, is that conscious experiences entail some kind of minimal
inner awareness of one’s ongoing mental functioning, and this is due to the ﬁrst-order state
being in some ways monitored or meta-represented by a relevant higher-order representa-
tion. This requirement of HOT distinguishes it from cognitive theories, such as GWT [8–11],
which also invoke additional cognitive processes as a crucial element of conscious experience,
but which do not posit this type of inner awareness. For this reason, GWT is a variant of
ﬁrst-order theory.
HOT is not a single entity. It in fact comes in many varieties [12–14] that are distinguished by the
different ways in which they deﬁne the relevant higher-order mechanism (Table 1). For example,
the traditional view, sometimes attributed to John Locke and Immanuel Kant, refers to the mech-
anism of inner awareness as an Inner Sense, akin to perception [15,16]. However, Inner Sense
HOTs, also referred to as Higher-Order Perception theories, have somewhat fallen out of
favor because of a failure to ﬁnd a neural implementation of an Inner Sense [17]. Another variety,
Dispositional HOT, posits that the mere availability of ﬁrst-order content to higher-order
mechanisms accounts for consciousness [18]. Other versions of HOT include the Phenomenal
Self theory [19], the Radical Plasticity Hypothesis [20], and variants of Higher-Order Thought The-
ory (HOTT) [3,12,14,21–24,49]. HOTT postulates that the higher-order state is thought-like, and
is the subject of much current discussion and debate [5,23,25–30].
Current Status of HOT
HOT emerged from a philosophical theory, but is not simply an intriguing philosophical hypothesis.
It is also broadly compatible with empirical ﬁndings in neuroscience. For example, under highly
controlled conditions, a difference in perceptual awareness is better correlated with activity
in brain areas responsible for high-level cognition rather than in early sensory regions [31,32].
Also, disruption of such activity by magnetic stimulation [33,34] or lesion [35] can change
subjective aspects of the perceptual experience. These ﬁndings have been reviewed previously
[13,36], and there have also been recent updates [23,37], in which some standard philosophical
objections have also been addressed.
Here, we discuss some of these ﬁndings and replies to objections in details. However, instead of pro-
viding yet another broad review,we go through these issues in the context of clarifying some common
misunderstandings by framing them in terms of questions about HOT. Given that much of the
evidence supporting HOT is also compatible with other cognitive theories of consciousness, such
as GWT, it has not been obvious how to arbitrate between the two. Our goal is to make clear this
distinction to allow further experiments to arbitrate between the different theories.
Does HOT Require Sophisticated Thoughts?
According to HOT, cognitive access, in the form of a kind of inner awareness, is necessary for
phenomenal consciousness. A common objection then is that HOT makes consciousness
require overly sophisticated mechanisms [4,38].2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
Glossary
Blindsight: the neurological
phenomenon that, after lesion to primary
visual cortex, patients deny having
conscious experience for the affected
regions in the visual ﬁeld, and yet they
can detect and discriminate visual
targets presented there above
chance levels.
Consciousness: term used to refer to
different mechanisms and phenomena,
such as whether a person is awake
versus in a coma, or is having subjective
experiences. Here, we are primarily
concerned with states that have
subjective phenomenal qualities, such
as perceptions, memories, thoughts, or
emotions.
First-order representations:
generallymental representations
about states of the world, or about one’s
situation in the world. In the case of
visual perception, for example, these
involve activity in striate and extrastriate
cortical areas, where neuronal ﬁring can
be directly driven by external stimuli,
such as lines, color, motion, and objects.
First-order theories of consciousness
include early sensory/local recurrency
and global broadcasting theories, and
do not require any additional higher-
order representations.
Higher-order representations:
generally about other mental
representations, such as ﬁrst-order
representations, and are usually
associated with areas of PFC.
Higher-order theory typically proposes
that the higher-order representation,
while necessary for consciousness, is
itself not one of which you are aware. To
be aware of a higher-order
representation requires an additional
higher-order representation.
Inner awareness: occurs when one is
aware of one’s own mental
representations, a process that we
propose involves higher-order
representations.
Introspection: in typical usage, this
refers to content resulting from the act of
intentional and effortful self-monitoring
and evaluation of ongoing conscious
experiences, as when one directs one’s
conscious thoughts to other conscious
states. HOT does not require this type of
elaborate, active, conscious
introspection for simple experiences.
Instead, they appeal to a relatively
passive (cognitively ‘leaner’) process of
metarepresentation, which operates at a
nonconscious level.
Trends in Cognitive SciencesOne version of this criticism is that HOTT appears to commit itself to the cognitive requirement of
having concepts about mental states that constitute the content of higher-order thoughts.
Various HOTTs respond differently to this challenge. Some appeal to innate concepts. Others
deny that the relevant conceptual capacities are sophisticated [3]. Still others question whether
concepts are required at all [23].
Another version of this objection argues that, given the richness of everyday experience, and the
fact that the human capacity for thoughts is limited, consciousness under HOTT would require
toomany higher-order thoughts [18]. However, the exact level and degree of complex processing
required to generate relevant higher-order thoughts is not currently known. Some higher-order
theorists propose that the relevant higher-order states may use relational concepts (‘x is bluer
than y’) [3], which would reduce both the amount of processing and number of thoughts required
relative to what might at ﬁrst be expected.
Confusion also results in part from the ways ‘thought,’ ‘introspection’, and ‘self,’ as used in HOT,
are interpreted by critics [28]. Traditionally, introspection refers to an active process in which one
becomes conscious of their inner states [39,40]. Similarly, ‘self’ is often used to refer to conscious
awareness of one’s self. The fact that higher-order philosophers tend to use propositional state-
ments involving personal pronouns (‘I see red’) to describe the higher-order thought has led to
the idea that HOT implies a conscious self that has introspective knowledge of its experiences
[41]. However, HOTT proponents, in fact, typically call upon a cognitively ‘lean’ conception of
both thought and self. In some versions, a monitoring mechanism that works at the subpersonal
level is postulated [42], while, in other versions, the thoughts are at the personal level but are arrived
at automatically and without appearing to be the product of inference [3]. Importantly, both the
leaner/passive and thicker/active versions of self and introspection relevant to HOT are distinct
frommore basic biological mechanisms referred to with terms such as ‘self as object’ (as opposed
to subject) [43,44], ‘core self’ [45], or the ‘machinery of self’ [46]. As such, the thoughts involved in
higher-order representations are not usually themselves viewed as ones we are conscious of being
in [3,15,23,24,36,47–49]. A further step, involving a more elaborate, active, form of introspection is
typically required to be conscious of the higher-order state.
While HOTs are typically agnostic regarding the status of consciousness in animals, the leaner
sense of introspection and self makes it an open question as to whether animals are conscious
under HOT. Many have argued for unique aspects of human cognition [50–52]. We suggest that
Tulving’s distinction between autonoetic (self) awareness and noetic (sematic) awareness [24,48,
49,53,54] offers a way of conceptualizing what kinds of phenomenally conscious experience
might be possible via cognitive re-representation in humans versus other animals. For example,
while only humans may experience autonoetic (self) consciousness (awareness of one’s self as
the subject and owner of the experience) [48,49,53], some other animals, especially non-human
primates [55–57], may, similar to humans, have higher-order noetic conscious states (e.g., aware-
ness of perceptual, conceptual, or memory representations) [49]. Still other animals may havemore
primitive forms of awareness (e.g., of body states) that do not involve higher-order representation
[45,58]. Nevertheless, demonstrating conscious awareness in animals is methodologically chal-
lenging [59–62] since most studies rely on mere analogy with human behavior [45,63–67]. Similar
issues and complications apply to questions about scientiﬁcally determining whether young infants
or robots may be conscious and, if so, in which way (or ways).
Does HOT Equate Consciousness with Metacognition or Conﬁdence?
In psychological experiments onmetacognition, subjects are often required to give conﬁdence rat-
ings after a simple perceptual or memory task, indicating how sure they are that their decisions areTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 3
Mental representation: can be
conscious or nonconscious, and
includes, for example, sensory,
perceptual, mnemonic, or conceptual
information.
Metacognition: formally, this refers to a
cognitive process about another
cognitive process. A task can tap into a
suprapersonal form of metacognition by
asking subjects to provide explicit
judgments about some aspect of
another process (e.g., conﬁdence about
how well one can discriminate a visual
target). However, metacognition can
also happen implicitly, at a subpersonal
level (e.g., some metacognitive process
is involved when we spontaneously
notice that we have made an error
without being required to do so, or when
we effortlessly recognize that a certain
visual image is caused by our own
imagination rather than triggered by an
external input).
Phenomenal consciousness: when
we say that an individual is
phenomenally conscious, we mean,
following Thomas Nagel, that they are
capable of having states for which there
is something that it is like, from the
individual’s point of view, to be in such
states. Although the term is sometimes
equated with ﬁrst-order states, it is, in
fact, itself neutral with respect towhether
phenomenal consciousness depends
on ﬁrst- or higher-order representations.
Our theoretical position is that the
higher-order account is correct.
Transitivity principle: assumes that
when you are in noway aware of being in
some mental state, there is nothing that
it is like for you to be in that mental state.
For example, if you are presented with a
red stimulus but are in noway aware that
you are seeing red, you are not
consciously experiencing red. The
converse of this is the transitivity principle
with which HOT is concerned, that
consciously seeing red depends in some
way on one being aware of having that
experience.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencescorrect. While these tasks are useful experimental devices for probing mechanisms relevant to con-
scious awareness, most proponents of HOT do not in fact treat metacognition and consciousness
as conceptually equivalent [68,69]. Metacognition, in this sense, is typically a process we are con-
scious of ourselves as engaging in, whereas the higher-order processes postulated by HOT to under-
lie inner awareness are typically ones we are not conscious of ourselves as engaging in.
Why then do proponents of HOT use explicit metacognitive tasks in experiments? One reason
may be related to an empirical observation. Evidence suggests that neural activity in prefrontal
cortex (PFC) is important for conscious perception [70]. When such activity is manipulated
with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), explicit (conscious) metacognition is also affected
[33,34,71]. This suggests that the brain mechanisms responsible for higher-order conscious ex-
perience and explicit metacognition are shared. Perhaps metacognition appeared ﬁrst in evolu-
tion as a process unrelated to consciousness, and then the same mechanism was later
‘recycled’ to enable consciousness. In this sense, explicit metacognitive tasks are a convenient
tool for studying mechanisms relevant to consciousness, even if these tasks do not necessarily
represent the sine qua non of consciousness.
For other proponents of HOT, there may be deeper conceptual reasons why some speciﬁc
metacognitive questions conveniently tap into the relevant higher-order states. For example, it
has been argued that, when a subject says, ‘I see a red square’, they are reporting a higher-
order thought; that is, they are reporting that they have a thought to the effect that ‘I see a red
square’. Some have argued [3] that this allows us to explain why we can verbally report our con-
scious states, but cannot verbally report unconscious mental states. Thus, to be able to report an
unconscious state, one would have to have the relevant higher-order thought. However, that
would mean that the state was conscious. So, in some cases where one expresses conﬁdence
in a judgment about seeing a red square, arguably the conﬁdence also expresses a higher-order
thought. However, while conﬁdence is generally a good guide, many higher-order theorists still
consider verbal report of awareness, not conﬁdence, to be the gold standard for showing that
one is in a conscious state [72].
Relatedly, some claim that metacognitive tasks can be performed with nonconscious (subliminal)
stimulus presentations (Box 1). This may be perceived as a challenge to HOT because it might be
viewed as an empirical example where there is higher-order awareness and/or conﬁdence but no
conscious experience. However, HOT itself is agnostic as to whether this form of metacognition
can occur. Since not every metacognitive judgment is of the kind postulated to engender con-
scious experience, it is an open question as to whether there may be some kind of metacognition
directed at unconscious states.
What Is the Difference between HOT and GWT?
Similar to HOT, variants of GWT also suggest that early sensory representations alone are insufﬁcient
for consciousness; additional processes are needed in both of the theories. For HOT, such processes
involve higher-order representations instantiating a kind of inner awareness, whereas, for GWT, the
essential processes boost and stabilize sensory signals. Thus, GWT is strictly a ﬁrst-order theory;
the broadcast signals are not necessarily metarepresentations (i.e., they are propagations of essen-
tially the same signal rather than a new representation about the relevant ﬁrst-order representation).
Therefore, while the two theories are somewhat related, they differ in important ways.
In a recent review, global broadcasting and higher-order monitoring were cast as two orthogonal
dimensions of processing [73]. The authors agreed that both kinds of process, especially their
conjunction, are typically involved in everyday conscious experiences; if one were to speculate4 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
Table 1. Differences between HOTs and Other Theories of Consciousness
Theorya Is it a
variety
of HOT?
Is ﬁrst-order
content
re-represented?
Are complex
‘thoughts’
required?
Is conceptual
processing
involved?
Is explicit
metacognition
required?
What is the function
of consciousness in
the theory?
Higher-Order Thought
Theory (HOTT) [3,13]
Yes Yes, but redescribed in
different format
Yes Yes No Little is assumed
by the theory
Higher-Order
Representation of a
Representation
(HOROR) [22–24]
Yes Yes, possibly
redescribed in different
format
Not clear Yes No Whatever the
function of the right
kind of higher-order
representations of
representations
turns out to be
Perceptual Reality
Monitoring Theory [42]
Yes No No, relevant
higher-order states
are mere indexes
No No Formation of
subjectively
justiﬁed beliefs
Multi-State Hierarchical
Model of Subjective
Self-Awareness [49]
Yes Diverse hierarchically
organized lower-order
states are
re-represented
Not required, but
can result
Yes, in the form
of schema
No Thoughts, beliefs,
memories,
feelings, and
attributions about
the world, and
about oneself as
an object and a
subject
Radical Plasticity Thesis
[20]
Yes Yes, but redescribed in
different format
No, relevant
higher-order states
are not thoughts
Typically no No Control of
behavior and
learning in novel
situations
First-order local
recurrency view
[1,6,78,87]
No No No No No Minimal
Global Workspace
Theory (GWT) [8–11]
No Propagated but not
necessarily
metarepresented
No No No Global sharing and
stabilization of
information
Global Workspace Plus
Metacognition [50,131]
No No No No Yes Global sharing and
stabilization of
information and
interpersonal
communication
aThis table only covers a few theories to highlight contrasts between different HOTs and between HOT and other theories in the literature. The issues in question are as
follows. (i) Is the theory a variety of HOT? (ii) Does ﬁrst-order content need to be re-represented at a later stage to become conscious? (iii) Does everyday experience mean
that many thought-like representations are involved at one moment? (iv) Does consciousness require capacity for conceptual processing? (v) Does consciousness require
explicit (contra subpersonal-level) metacognition? (vi) What is the function of consciousness?
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesabout the way in which conscious artiﬁcial intelligence could be built, both dimensions would be
relevant. However, while global broadcasting tends to go hand-in-hand with higher-order
awareness in typical cases, this is not necessarily true for all conscious experiences. For exam-
ple, in peripheral vision, one has the sense of consciously seeing the details, but the details are
typically not globally accessible as such. HOT accounts for this by interpreting such cases
in terms of higher-order inﬂation (Box 2) and, thus, without requiring actual broadcast of the
detailed content.
The contrary may also occur: information that is globally broadcasted may not be subjectively
experienced. For example, imagine maintaining images of a few abstract shapes to respond a
few seconds later about what the shapes are. During the delay, active vivid imagery may not
be necessary. In fact, vividness of imagery varies between individuals [74], but even those who
do not experience anything like normal seeing during the delay (i.e., they are not vivid imagers)Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 5
Box 2. Subjective Inﬂation in the Unattended Periphery
One’s impression of experiencing details is not necessarily fully veridical. We have the subjective impression of seeing vivid
color in the periphery despite our relatively poor early sensory processing. According to proponents of HOT, our subjective
impression may be at times inﬂated beyond the actual representational capacity [136], due to misrepresentation at the
higher-order level. This is different from the more traditional account of ‘ﬁlling in’ [137], which suggests that actual details
are added at the ﬁrst-order sensory level. In the higher-order account, the ﬁrst-order details may remain scant. The two
mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive. The subjective richness may be due in part to ﬁrst-order ﬁlling-in, augmented
by higher-order inﬂation.
Against this view, Ned Block [5] argued that color perception is in fact not weak in the periphery if we enlarge the stimuli for
the periphery to compensate for the larger receptive ﬁeld size there [23]. However, we are not sure how this point is rele-
vant because, in real life rather than in calibrated psychophysics experiments, stimuli do not automatically enlarge them-
selves upon entering our periphery. What matters is that, for the same stimuli, color processing is relatively weak in the
periphery, and yet we see the world as somewhat rather uniform.
Besides color [138], inﬂation for other attributes are also well documented: for example, subjects reported higher false
alarm rates for detection in the periphery, or in unattended locations. Critics argue that these results only reﬂected a bias
in responding strategies, and it would beg the question to assume that such biases necessarily reﬂect inﬂated subjective
experiences [5]. However, it is unclear whether the charge of begging the question is fair, because proponents of HOT do
provide independent reasons for believing that the inﬂation results reﬂect experiences rather than just responses. For in-
stance, if inﬂation reﬂects a biased strategy, it would be difﬁcult to explain why the results persisted even upon training with
extensive feedback. The hypothesis that subjective experience itself inﬂates appears to account for the data as well as
anecdotal experience better.
Box 1. Unconscious Working Memory and Metacognition
The possibility that workingmemory andmetacognition may operate nonconsciously is sometimes taken as a challenge to
HOT. In the main text, we argued that these claims, even if true, pose no threat to HOT per se.
Independently, it is also important to point out that claims of explicit metacognition with nonconscious stimuli (as opposed
to implicit or unconscious metacognition) are still not totally convincing; these hinge on how unconsciousness is deﬁned.
As has been pointed out by decades of psychophysics, simply asking people to label trials within a task condition as
‘consciously seen’ versus ‘unconscious’ is not always sufﬁcient [132]. There is a serious concern about an arbitrary crite-
rion being set to ﬁt trials into the two forced labels. At-chance discrimination is traditionally considered a conservative cri-
terion for showing that the stimuli are not consciously perceived [132] and, as blindsight shows, above-chance
discrimination does not mean that the relevant stimuli are consciously perceived. Alternatively, one can try to show that,
although such stimuli can be discriminated better than chance, they are subjectively indistinguishable from a ‘blank’ stim-
ulus containing no information [133]. However, current efforts to demonstrate ‘unconscious’ working memory [134] and
unconscious metacognition [133] have not passed either of these two criteria for demonstrating unawareness.
Overall, to the extent that they are convincing demonstrations, studies of unconscious processing are constrained by the
fact that such stimuli are typically weak (to pass either of the above criteria) [135]. Thus, as with the discussion of animal
consciousness (see main text), it is important to keep in mind that there may be a gap between what we can measure sci-
entiﬁcally and what is indeed conscious or not. That is, the fact that it is difﬁcult to demonstrate nonconscious working
memory and metacognition does not rule out the possibility that they exist.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
6 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xxtend to have no problem holding the information [75]. Given that the information is globally acces-
sible in both cases (seeing versus holding information online in memory with and/or without
strong imagery), what accounts for the difference in phenomenology? This is unlikely to be a sim-
ple matter of differences in richness of information between top-down versus bottom-up
processes. For example, in dreams and hallucinations, when there is also no bottom-up input,
the subjective experience is still vivid. HOT suggests this is due to the higher-order processes.
While these cases do not decisively prove that GWT is wrong, they do raise questions regarding
whether global availability and informational richness along can account for the difference in
phenomenology. These cases also suggest possible experimental way of arbitrating between
the theories.
Trends in Cognitive SciencesIs HOT Merely a Theory of Access Consciousness?
Some proponents of GWT posit that global broadcast is a mechanism for conscious access,
implying that access rather than phenomenology per se is all one can experimentally study [76]
(see [11] for a possible exception). However, while it is possible to construe HOT as merely a
theory of access consciousness [27], many proponents of HOT argue that it is primarily about
subjective experiences rather than cognitive access to information.
For example, experiments in which one can report phenomenally experiencing a large array of
stimuli but is unable to report the details are often used to challenge HOT. It is argued that,
because the mechanism that allows access is occupied with doing other tasks (i.e., overﬂowed
with other content) [77], one is not able to access all of one’s phenomenally conscious experi-
ences at any given moment. Such evidence has been taken to support ﬁrst-order views [78].
However, HOT also readily provides an account of these ﬁndings, precisely because HOT is
about experience not reports per se. That is, participants’ impression of rich and unreportable
experience may be inﬂated beyond what the ﬁrst-order states in fact represent. Subjects may
experience these states as being rich and full of detail when in fact their conscious experience
lacks this richness. We discuss this so-called ‘subjective inﬂation’ in Box 2.
A related line of criticism of HOT is that much of the empirical evidence supporting it comes
from tasks requiring subjects to report about the stimuli, and the act of reporting could be a
confound [79]. Therefore, the critics suggest the use of so-called ‘no report’ paradigms,
in which subjects are not asked to make reports about the relevant stimuli [80]. Advocacy of
such paradigms, in our opinion, has unfortunately generated undue excitement. It is, of course,
important to control for experimental confounds. Indeed, this ‘task demand’ (i.e., the need for
subjects to report about the relevant stimuli) has long been controlled for and addressed in the
literature [81–83]. It is also true that, when subjects were required to direct their attention away
from the stimulus, some studies failed to ﬁnd a difference in the degree to which higher-order
activity tracked conscious perception using basic neuroimaging analysis [79]. However, it is
a mistake to generalize from these null ﬁndings, because studies using more sensitive methods
showed clear involvement of higher-order mechanisms, even when the subjects were not re-
quired to report about the stimuli [37,84,85].
Is Consciousness Better Correlated with First-Order Content?
Perhaps one reason why critics often think that HOT is about report and access is that, pre-
theoretically, conscious experiences appear to be associated with ﬁrst-order perception [1,86].
After all, activity in the visual cortex is typically understood to reﬂect the content in the conscious
experiences concerned, even in some versions of HOT [23]. For example, if V4 processes infor-
mation about color, and MT processes information about motion, then one might expect that
these are the areas that subserve conscious experience of these properties [87]. Therefore,
anything beyond ﬁrst-order content areas may just reﬂect post-perceptual processing that allows
cognitive access and reporting.
However, while it is true that the various visual areas appear to code relevant content, it is unclear
whether their link to consciousness is straightforward. It is known that subliminal or nonconscious
stimulation also engages similar sensory circuits as consciously experienced stimuli [88]. Also,
ongoing spontaneous activity in the very same neurons that underlie normal perception is typically
nonconscious [89]. One possibility is that such activity has to reach a certain threshold [90],
or that it has to achieve the right sort of dynamic proﬁle [89], such as involving feedback to V1.
However, patients with damage to V1 can still have visual experiences [23,91]. So, at least
from the outset, an alternative appears to be just as plausible: that (extrastriate) visual activityTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 7
Trends in Cognitive Scienceshas to be re-represented by higher-order processes to become conscious, as suggested
by HOT.
This is related to another common criticism of HOT concerning possiblemismatches between higher-
order and ﬁrst-order contents [27]. This is only a concern in models in which the higher-order repre-
sentation redescribes the content from the ﬁrst level, which is not true of all HOTs [23]. These criti-
cisms have also been discussed and addressed elsewhere [22–24]. Even so, these considerations
suggest that the notion of a mismatch is not merely a philosophical objection to HOT but instead
can be seen as an empirical predication of HOT. That is, HOT predicts that we should ﬁnd cases
where subjective experience varies (along with higher-order representations) while ﬁrst-order content
remains constant, for which there is some supporting evidence [23].
Does HOT Imply That Consciousness Lacks a Function?
While some proponents of HOTT argue that possible functions of consciousness are likely
minimal [3], others do not necessarily agree [92]. Regardless, this does not mean that higher-
order representations are epiphenomena; it simply means that HOT itself, as a theory, is not
committed to making strong assumptions about what the functions of consciousness may be,
without further empirical evidence. Thus, consciousness itself does not necessarily guarantee
superior behavioral performance in a task, but it might in some situations [49,92].
This last point may be particularly relevant for understanding powerful forms of nonconscious
processing, such as blindsight, in which patients deny having subjective experiences following
damage to the visual cortex, even though they can guess the identity of visual stimuli well
above chance level [93]. For GWT, this lack of conscious experience must mean that the relevant
signal is not globally available to all major modules of the brain; somehow, some local pathway
must have made possible the successful guessing and stimulus identiﬁcation. Although we do
not argue against the existence of such local pathway [94], it does raise the questions, if a
local pathway can support behavioral performance too, what exactly is the beneﬁt of global
broadcast? Are these local pathways always unconscious?
According to HOT, the answer is no. A mere difference in the higher-order state determines
whether a nonconscious perceptual process is consciously experienced [22,24,95]; that is,
whether an early sensory signal is conscious does not depend on its anatomical locus alone
(global or local); the very same sensory signal can be conscious or not depending on a higher-
order process. This is why some nonconscious processes can be so powerful: they have all
the functions of the ﬁrst-order components of a conscious process. Yet, this does not necessarily
mean that the additional higher-order process makes no additional contribution. However, what
this contribution might be depends on the variant of HOT.
Does HOT Propose That Consciousness Is in the Prefrontal Cortex?
HOT is not about PFC per se. It is a theory about fundamental cognitive requirements of con-
sciousness. Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience have clearly implicated PFC in higher
cognitive mechanisms [96–98], such as metacognitive mechanisms that underlie higher-order
representations. These ﬁndings are consistent with our hypothesis that PFC is a key part of the
network with a crucial role in generating the relevant kind of higher-order cognitive states that
underlie phenomenal awareness, as depicted in Figure 1 and described further in Box 3.
However, as in the discussion of the role of sophisticated thoughts in HOT, different HOTs do not
agree on what PFC contributes to consciousness. Some proponents of HOTT have suggested
that a conscious ﬁrst-order visual state involves one having a certain speciﬁc kind of PFC activity8 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
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Figure 1. Prefrontal Network Proposed to Underlie Higher-Order Perceptual Awareness. In higher-order theor
(HOT), neural states of First-Order networks are viewed as nonconscious representations that are rendered conscious whe
re-represented by the higher-order network involving areas of prefrontal cortex. This model mainly applies to perceptua
awareness. See Figure I in Box 3 for ways in which this model might be modiﬁed to account for higher-order awareness o
conceptual, mnemonic, and emotional information. Abbreviations: DL, dorsal lateral; FP, frontal pole; VL, ventral lateral.
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f[36]. A related view is that higher-order prefrontal representations index the relevant ﬁrst-order
content in sensory areas to allow that content to enter consciousness [23]. In this sense,
consciousness is ‘jointly determined’ by concurrent activity in the higher-order areas and areas
that maintain the lower-order representations. Alternatively, in higher-order representation of a
representation (HOROR) theory, the relevant higher-order state in PFC itself is phenomenally con-
scious [22,24,95]. The multistate hierarchical model proposes that diverse kinds of lower-order
states are represented and integrated with self-information to give rise to higher-order conscious
states involving one’s self [49]. Which of these, if any, might be correct is an open question
(Table 1). Despite these differences between theories, most variants of HOT are united in their
agreement that PFC has a key role in consciousness; but proponents of HOT do not typically
assume that one is ‘more conscious’ whenever there is more PFC activity. Unlike early sensory
neural representations, PFC neurons do not straightforwardly signal constant stimulus features;
neuronal coding may be complex and involve local and distributed ensembles within and
between areas of PFC [99] (also see Figure I in Box 3). As such, observations that activity in a
given PFC region, as measured with neuroimaging, may decrease while one is dreaming [100],
or in a psychedelic state [101], do not pose a challenge to HOT; such a simple relationship at
this coarse-grained level is not generally presumed to be the case by HOT.
In evaluating current data, it is important to note that ‘PFC’ is a generic conception that subsumes
several different subregions and functional specializations [49,102–108]. Unfortunately, this diver-
sity has not always been kept in mind when discussing the involvement of the PFC in HOT or
other theories about consciousness. Some have even argued against constitutive involvement
of PFC in any form of consciousness, using ﬁndings from cases with partial lesions of some
areas of PFC [109]. However, the anatomical details reported were at times inaccurate [37].
Box 3 suggests how the heterogeneity of PFC, and the rich diversity of its inputs, can be lever-
aged to achieve a broader, more nuanced view of higher-order representations in consciousness.
Why Is HOT Needed?
Much of the debate about the nature of consciousness and its neural underpinnings has
concerned visual perception. While we believe that HOT has advantages in this area, we propose
that it is especially useful in accounting for everyday experiences (e.g., appreciation of art, music,
or poetry; reminiscing about our past; experiencing emotions; or reﬂecting upon our self).gnitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 9
Trends in Cognitive SciencesEmotion, which has largely been ignored in the modern scientiﬁc study of consciousness [24], is a
case in point.
Recent theories and research implicate cognition and conceptual knowledge as being central to
conscious emotional experience [48,49,110–113]. Cognitive theories of emotion are also impor-
tant in understanding psychopathological conditions, which often crucially involve thoughts about
one’s life problems (e.g., [114–116]. Therefore, HOT, and its cognitive underpinnings, may offer a
framework for understanding both healthy and maladaptive emotions. The HOROR variant of
HOTT [22,23] has, in fact been used to account for emotional consciousness [24].
For decades, the subjective experiences of patients with affective disorders have been marginal-
ized when evaluating the effectiveness of behavioral, cognitive, and pharmaceutical treatments
[117]. In medical models, for example, the goal has been to ﬁnd biological correlates that, if
changed, especially by drugs, will solve the problem [48,118]. However, these efforts to develop
novel agents through studies of animals have been so unsuccessful that the pharmaceutical
industry has signiﬁcantly scaled back research in this area [119].
Such considerations underlie recent debates about whether targeting subcortical circuits, such
as those of the amygdala, will help to alleviate symptoms of fear and anxiety in disorders such
as phobias [118,120,121]. Of course, in a sense, the amygdala is important and relevant
for fear disorders. However, lf, in both mental health and psychoample evidence also suggests
that it is unlikely to be the full story [24,48,117]. It is known that threats can elicit amygdala activity
and trigger physiological responses nonconsciously [122,123]. Participants do not typicallyBox 3. Prefrontal Cortex and Higher-Order Experience
‘PFC’ subsumes several different subregions (some located laterally and some medially) with different cytoarchitectonic
properties (granular, dysgranular, or agranular), different patterns of connectivity with each other and with sensory,
memory, and conceptual processing regions, and different phylogenetic histories, with some present in all mammals,
some mainly in primates (dorsolateral), and some particularly well developed or perhaps even unique in humans (aspects
of the frontal pole) [102–107]. This complexity, although at ﬁrst sight appears daunting, might in fact offer opportunities for
a more nuanced view of how PFC contributes to experience.
Lau and Rosenthal [13] presented a proposal for the role of speciﬁc areas of PFC in higher-order representations. Key
areas in their model were the dorsolateral and polar regions of PFC. While their review was primarily about visual percep-
tion, adding the ventral lateral PFC allowed their model to generalize to other external senses [39] (Figure 1). Consistent
with Rosenthal’s HOTT [3], they suggested that higher-order representations in this network are not themselves con-
sciously experienced, but instead facilitate the experience of ﬁrst-order states. In their model, conscious experience of
the higher-order representation itself requires an additional level of higher-order representation (not shown); although
Lau and Rosenthal did not identify the source of the additional higher-order representation, the highly conceptual nature
of polar prefrontal region makes it a candidate worth considering.
For the higher-order network model to account for more complex kinds of experience (e.g., of memories, emotions, and
self), it needs to be revised to include lower-order states related to such experiences (Figure Ia). Given that some of the
areas involved are themselves prefrontal areas, the nature of lower-order states may need to be reconceived [49]. For ex-
ample, medial and insula prefrontal areas receive inputs from conceptual, memory, and subcortical circuits, as well as from
sensory/perceptual inputs, and, in turn, connect with lateral-polar prefrontal areas. In other words, these prefrontal areas
may construct lower-order, representations used by the lateral-polar prefrontal areas in the assembly of higher-order
representations that are phenomenally experienced. If so, despite the fact that the prefrontal areas in question are
higher-order anatomically and cognitively, they are lower order in relation to the higher-order network.
Alternatively, it is possible that the traditional higher-order network has been conceived too narrowly, and should include
medial and insula prefrontal areas (Figure Ib). Another possibility is that the higher-order network does not involve a ﬁxed
set of prefrontal areas but instead a coalition of areas and connections that is ﬂexibly recruited on a situational basis tomeet
the needs of the moment [49], not unlike the working memory collation hypothesis [139]. Alternatively, the higher-order
network might extend beyond PFC and also involve posterior cortical areas in the parietal and/or temporal lobes.
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Figure I. Proposed Variants of the Prefrontal Higher-Order Network. (A) The prefrontal higher-order network is
extended to account for conceptual, mnemonic, and emotional awareness. To do this, the nature of the lower-order states is
reconceived, because some of the inputs to the traditional higher-order network are from other prefrontal areas, especially
from medial and insula cortex (note that medial areas shown are only some of the possible relevant areas; also note that the
insula region is buried below the cortical surface and is not depicted in these illustrations). (B) An alternative to the view in (A) is
that all of the prefrontal areas indicated are part of the higher-order network, and that the lower-order inputs are all from
nonprefrontal areas. As described in the main text, it is also possible that areas of the higher order prefrontal network are
ﬂexibly recruited on a situation-by-situation basis, and it is also possible that parietal and/or temporal cortical areas are
involved. Color code: blue letters and shading depict higher-order, and green letters and shading lower-order, areas.
Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DL, dorsal lateral; FP, frontal pole;Orb,Orbital; VL, ventral lateral; VM, ventromedial.
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Trends in Cogspontaneously report feelings, but even when asked for a verbal report, they do not respond in a
way that would suggest they experienced an emotion appropriate to the eliciting stimulus [124].
Furthermore, direct electrical stimulation of the amygdala reliably elicits physiological responses,
but only rarely subjective experiences [125]; even when subjective experiences are elicited, it is
unclear that these arise from the amygdala itself, as opposed to resulting from activity spreading
to higher-order processes [48]. Also, patients with amygdala lesions can consciously report emo-
tional experiences [126], including fear [127]. If conscious emotions are higher-order cognitive
cortical states, this might explain why antianxiety medications developed by assessing effectsnitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 11
Outstanding Questions
Can normal conscious experiences
occur in the absence of ﬁrst-order
activity? While evidence exists that
stimulation of PFC can change con-
scious experience, it is not clear
whether this happens in the absence
of distal impact on ﬁrst-order sensory
activity. This might be studied in
future experiments by monitoring ac-
tivity in ﬁrst-order regions while stimu-
lating higher-order regions at an
intensity that would not lead to wide-
spread network changes.
Taking the above question one step
further, we can ask whether conscious
experience can be preserved when the
ﬁrst-order regions are completely
absent (because of a brain lesion or
temporary inactivation). While such al-
terations would be expected to result
in changes in higher-order states by re-
ducing input signals to the higher-order
network, future advances in methods
may make it possible to stimulate
higher-order regions in ways that mimic
spatial and temporal properties of
normal activity in the absence of a
contribution of ﬁrst-order states. With
such methods, it might someday be
possible to resolve current debates.
Do patientswith damage to lower-order
circuits typically associated with emo-
tions (e.g., the amygdala) or patients
with alexithymia, experience emotions
differently from control subjects? If so,
are these accounted for by high-level
emotional processing at the conceptual
level? For example, are schema in-
volved, and does their activation pattern
complete the subjective experience in
the presence of trigger stimuli, even if
body feedback is reduced or eliminated
by damage to subcortical circuits?
How do we exactly delineate between
the lower-order and higher-order net-
Trends in Cognitive Scienceson behaviors controlled by subcortical circuits in animals have not been as successful as once
hoped in changing human subjective experiences.
Thus, HOT provides a principled account to address what may be missing: to effectively treat
problems related to fear and anxiety, the higher-order mechanisms of consciousness involving
various areas of PFC, and the lower-order mechanisms involving subcortical defensive circuitry,
may both have to be treated [48,118]. However, to do so effectively, each may have to be
targeted separately, otherwise either one may reinstate the other [48,117,118,121].
In a related context, studies of patients with alexithymia may also be relevant [128]. These pa-
tients are traditionally classiﬁed as having difﬁculty recognizing, imagining, and thinking about
emotions. However, it appears likely that, in addition to having problems in emotion-related
cognition, these patients may also experience emotions rather differently. Some evidence for
this comes from standard diagnostic questionnaires [e.g., Online Alexthymia Questionnaire
(http://oaq.blogspot.com/)], including items such as ‘I make decisions based on principles
rather than gut feelings’; ‘I sometimes experience confusing sensations in my body’; and
‘For me sex is more a functional activity than it is an emotional one.’ Indeed, one imaging
study showed that these patients showed activity differing from control subjects in higher-
order (i.e., prefrontal) regions, and in the insula cortex, but not in the amygdala [129]. HOT,
when modiﬁed in the ways described in Box 3, provides a way of accounting for such
alterations in subjective experiences.
Concluding Remarks
Taken together, these considerations suggest that HOT can be considered as a middle position
between GWT and early sensory ﬁrst-order local theories. GWT posits that consciousness is
constitutively associated with high-level global cognition [8–10]. First-order local [87,90,130] the-
ories suggest that no higher-level cognitive processes are constitutively required. HOT suggests
that speciﬁc high-level processes are required, but such processes do not necessarily lead to
global broadcasting and advantages in performance in simple tasks [13].
This middle position offers certain advantages. First, it accounts for why some powerful forms of
unconscious processing are possible (e.g., blindsight). Second, it eliminates the cumbersome
task faced by local theories of having to explain every distinct kind of phenomenology with a
different ﬁrst-order mechanism. Third, while GWT and HOT both propose a uniﬁed mechanism
for consciousness, we argue that HOT has advantages accounting for how phenomenal experi-
ences are assembled. Finally, we argue that HOT more readily accounts for the complexity of the
phenomenology underlying not only our perceptions, but also our memories and emotions, and
our awareness of our self, in both mental health and psychopathological conditions. Some issues
for future work are listed in Outstanding Questions.works? Out of convenience, we oftenAcknowledgments
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